Löw Maintenance: The Changing Shape of Germany

It’s trite to start an article with a cliché - generally, I avoid them like the plague - but sometimes one really does hit the nail on the head. Because as Joachim Löw has recently discovered, pain can indeed be the best teacher.

“We have reached a phase where we have to renew things, improve, start from scratch. We need to draw the right conclusions and take the right measures.”

That was the Germany manager’s statement after the Netherlands’ 2-0 victory over France condemned Germany to relegation from the Nations League Group A. It was just one more humiliation piled high atop many others - a 3-0 defeat to their greatest rivals, the Dutch, a group stage exit at the World Cup, and of course Mesut Özil’s allegations of institutionalised racism within the DFB and the unflattering fallout that followed.

2018 has, by some distance, been the worst year in the history of German football. When they somehow snatched a draw from the yawning maw of a comfortable victory in Gelsenkirchen last night, it may appear like a suitably diabolical sign-off to die Mannschaft’s torrid year.

Given all of that, it would be entirely understandable to think that Löw’s vague call to “renew things” rang rather hollow.

And yet…

The 2-2 draw against the Netherlands, as unedifying as its denouement may have been, represented a very different performance that the one they put out during their humiliation in Amsterdam. More importantly, it featured the second outing for a 3-4-3 formation that represents Löw’s first major tactical change of gears since he took over the national side way back in 2006.

At the World Cup, the Germans stuck with the rigid 4-2-3-1 that had served them for over a decade. It proved to be a catastrophic mistake as first Mexico and South Korea found it far too easy to close ranks on the German front four who found themselves utterly isolated from their immobile midfield.

The problem was highlighted most clearly in Kazan against the Koreans. Time and again, a direct ball, played swiftly from central midfield, would find its way to Özil, Goretzka or Reus only for them to be surrounded by red shirts while Timo Werner ran aimlessly down a channel that could not be used.

The German forwards, unable to make a meaningful attacking pass, would look back and find the full back and the two central midfielders back in their own half, having played the initial ball from too deep. The only remaining option became a hopeful long cross which the South Korean defence would handle with ease.

The problem appeared to be a failure by Löw to adapt to his changing personnel. Timo Werner was not, and could never be, Miroslav Klose. He is an entirely different kind of striker who runs wide of the box in order to create space for others to run in to, or tries to get in behind the last man rather than using his strength and aerial presence to pose a threat from high crosses.

The German forward line was utterly unequipped to run into the space created, or get Werner himself in behind an opposing back line. Players who needed to have pace for the selection to work did not have it.

That has changed.

Against both the Netherlands and in a friendly against Russia on Friday, Werner found himself flanked by Leroy Sané and Serge Gnabry - forwards who both possess a serious turn of speed and are comfortable running either into the spaces created by Werner or beyond the last man to make or receive passes from closer to the box. Both of Germany’s goals against the Netherlands came from lofted passes that bypassed the Dutch defence and midfield and allowed the German front line to use that fearsome pace. It is hard to imagine the Germany of old creating Sané’s goal.

The central midfield platform has changed, as well. Kimmich and Kroos (or, as it was against Russia, 19-year-old Kai Havertz) are now being used in a double-pivot formation with the wing backs coming up alongside them to transition play towards the front line. Whereas, previously, the midfield and full-backs were kept adrift of the final third, now the wide players can press forward, with the extra central defender creating the security required.

Timo Werner

The personnel, too, is changing. Just two members of the 2014 World Cup-winning squad remain (Manuel Neuer and Matthias Ginter) and youngsters such as Thilo Kehrer (who started both matches at right wing-back) and the aforementioned Havertz are being given an opportunity. Crucially, the method of trying to match up newer inclusions with the roles played by former greats seems to have been abandoned.

Of course, there are still issues. There is no particular sign that Löw has identified a preferred back three, and adaptation to a new defensive system will inevitably be slow - both of the Dutch goals on Monday night involved players failing to pick up their man despite having the numbers back. There is mounting speculation that Mats Hummels, a stalwart of the side for many years who started against Russia but was dropped for the match against the Netherlands, may be put out to pasture.

Germany need to identify the right men to fulfill these new defensive duties if they are to put their disastrous 2018 behind them. At the time of writing, we are still waiting on Poland’s result against Portugal to discover whether Germany might find themselves as second seeds for European Championship qualifying. With the Nations League play-offs lost to them and the prospect of having to handle at least one very strong side in qualification, there is not much more time for the necessary adaptations to take place.

If Löw can finally make the adjustments needed to accommodate a new generation of German footballers - and prove that the DFB’s decision to keep faith in him in the face of mounting evidence was right - then all can become right once more with Europe’s most successful football nation.

Should he fail to solve the puzzles still being presented, then the prospect of a first major tournament without Germany since 1950 will loom very large indeed.